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Abstract 
English 
In this bachelor's thesis I enquire into the factors that expose a country to the risk of civil war. In 
the first part of my work I present the major positions in the scientific debate on civil war causation 
and illustrate controversies arising from different interpretations of key variables. In the second part 
I apply my findings to the Islamic Republic of Iran elaborating on the risk factors in the light of the 
so-called “feasibility hypothesis”. 
Italiano 
La tesi – redatta in lingua inglese – indaga i fattori che mettono un Paese a rischio di guerra civile 
e si articola in due parti. Nella prima parte si presentano i principali orientamenti emersi nel 
dibattito scientifico sull'origine delle guerre civili e si approfondiscono i principali fattori causali 
che emergono da un'analisi econometrica, prospettandone le difficoltà interpretative. Nella seconda 
parte del lavoro, si procede all'applicazione della cosiddetta “ipotesi sulla fattibilità” a un caso di 
studio, la Repubblica Islamica dell'Iran, discutendone opportunità e rischi.  
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Introduction – What does it take to make a war? 
The question why wars occur has, of course, always been on historians' minds. After all, history 
is made up of periods, in which tensions between actors in a society are processed by peacetime 
means, but also of moments when mechanisms of conflict resolution fail. Depending on the scale of 
the underlying conflict, which thus comes to a head, fierce battles may ensue and have indeed en-
sued and continue to do so, as a random look at media coverage on any of these days will readily 
reveal. 
Although the tendency of certain historiographers to represent historical events exclusively as a 
sequence of spectacular sanguinary battles is certainly to be condemned, it would also be a mistake 
to downplay the incidence of wars. 
A war is “a state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups within a coun-
try”1 and these are indeed the only levels of conflict where the term applies. This is reflected in cur-
rent political debate, where the most commonly reported dimensions of war are the civil war and 
the somewhat quirky – some say oxymoronic – humanitarian war. Other categories of violent con-
flict include interstate war (or “full-fledged war”), internationalized internal armed conflict, geno-
cide, ethnic cleansing, politicide, etc. I shall come back to this terminological issue later. 
According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, after the end of the Second World War there 
have been 1,580 internal armed conflicts and 118 interstate wars. To date we count 30 ongoing 
armed conflicts, whereof 21 are intrastate and 9 internationalized internal armed conflicts. No inter-
state war is currently accounted for.
2
 Hence, if we want to understand violent conflict in the mod-
ern-day world, we may gain a lot from focusing on struggles internal to a country. 
Civil wars are intrastate wars. Different definitions of the term have been proposed. Mostly, they 
are focused on the wars' “frequency, magnitude, severity, and intensity” as anticipated by Small and 
Singer (1970) in their path-breaking paper which laid the bases for quantitative civil war research.
3
 
Since those early days an extensive literature on civil war issues has been produced. In this paper I 
will concentrate on the topic of civil war causation. 
In the first chapter I discuss premises and methodological problems. In chapter two I present 
three contrasting theories of civil war causation. Chapter three is about the Collier-Hoeffler model, 
an opportunity-centred policy instrument for developing conflict prevention strategies. Finally, in 
chapter four I apply that model to the Islamic Republic of Iran discussing strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats – both of Iran and of the model. 
                                                 
1Oxford English Dictionary, 2011 
2For definitions and coding criteria see http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/. The given figures exclude so-
called extra-systemic wars. 
3SMALL and Singer (1970), p.145 
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FIRST PART 
Chapter 1 – Levels of conflict 
Human existence is conflictual in nature. Conflicts unfold on several levels. To begin with there 
are intrapersonal conflicts, i.e. struggles interior to the individual and originating from what, in bor-
rowing from the terminology of psychoanalysis, I shall call their “drives”. These can be thought of 
as vectorial forces pushing the individual towards certain behaviours. They are counterbalanced by 
the forces of “conscience” and “reason”. 
Secondly, there is the interpersonal level of conflict, where two individuals clash due to differing 
views, different sets of values, shortcomings in communication or what other reasons for controver-
sy there may be. 
The landscape of potential conflict grows ever more complex when we add interactions between 
three or more people. This is because we have to keep track of how intrapersonal mechanisms de-
termine individual behaviour, how this behaviour is viewed by others and what reactions it produces, 
then assess the interactional pattern and try to determine how it influences third-party perception 
and action. 
1.1 THE GROUP 
In the social sciences much emphasis is placed on the group: primary and secondary groups, in- 
and out-groups, peer groups, reference groups, interest groups – just to name a few – are examples 
of the terminology used to describe social aggregations that come under the general heading of 
groups. 
An important working hypothesis in social psychology views groups as “dynamic entities” enact-
ing complex patterns of interaction both on the in- and outside. In order to describe these dynamics, 
it is useful to refer to the terminology of psychoanalysis introduced above. 
If, for the sake of simplicity, we consider large groups as an embodiment of an aggregated drive 
and reason, just as any individual embodies their own drive and reason, it is legitimate to speak of a 
group's goals. All the more so as groups, just as any individual of sound mind, are able to articulate 
their goals clearly and expressly, e.g. through a declaration of intentions, a charter, or the like. 
Talking about large rebel organizations and combat units, we can confidently expect that our as-
sumption about the personality of groups holds true for such larger-scale observations, too. 
Yet psychoanalysis is neither the prevalent nor the only set of ideas being discussed in psycholo-
gy. An interesting alternative is given by behaviourism, which sees the organism as a kind of au-
tomaton “'responding' to conditions (stimuli) set by the outer environment and by inner biological 
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processes”.4 
Groups, accordingly, act upon incentives provided by the surrounding world. Hence, in order to 
study group behaviour, one needs to assess the de facto outside world irrespective of the way indi-
viduals represent the latter to themselves. In behaviourism, group action is not about an aggregated 
drive and reason but about being conditioned by circumstances. 
I touch upon this branch of theory – though briefly and superficially – because it provides me 
with useful metaphors to illustrate different policy narratives in chapter two. 
1.2 WHEN IS A WAR A CIVIL WAR? 
Answering this question is crucial in modern political science. New econometric techniques now 
allow for a sophisticated analysis of historical data on civil wars. But in order to be effective and to 
produce meaningful results these instruments need coding standards. The above question can be 
broken down into different aspects. 
To begin with, the actors: Is government involvement necessary? What about states where there 
is war but no more government? What if rebels claim they have formed their own legitimate gov-
ernment? What size and degree of organization are required in order for a rebel group to be consid-
ered effective? 
Secondly, the conflict's incidence: Is there a minimum death toll a violent conflict must reach to 
be considered a war? Do we count total deaths or per capita deaths, do we operate a cumulative 
death count or do we look at individual years? 
Thirdly, distribution: How can we account for effective resistance? What about conflicts where 
violence is unilateral? How do we handle state deaths as opposed to civilian deaths? What does cas-
ualty (and, for that sake, collateral damage) mean? 
As anticipated in the introductory lines to this chapter there are, then, a whole range of other cat-
egories of violent conflict. Ambitious collections of information on civil conflicts – each with their 
own individual coding criteria – have been assembled and huge databases are now available to the 
interested public.
5
 
Small and Singer (1982) gave a standard definition of civil war, whose subsequent evolutions the 
authoritative Correlates of War dataset is based on today. As civil war they code “any armed conflict 
that involves (a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the nation-
                                                 
4From: Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/ (accessed on October 27, 2011) 
5For raw data, readers may refer to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) or the Correlates of War Project (COW). 
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's Yearbook (SIPRI) provides rather elaborate and slightly 
more popular accounts. 
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al government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides”. Furthermore, state violence should be 
sustained and reciprocated and the war exceed a certain threshold of deaths (typically more than 
1,000).
6
 
These coding conventions were revised by Gleditsch (2004). Collier et al. (2006), whose paper I 
quote in the upcoming chapter, work with this updated set of data. 
Chapter 2 – What moves a rebel group? 
Not only historians and philanthropists are concerned with war, but so are political scientists and 
economists. After the end of the Second World War, another species of scholars, whom I may call 
the “developmentists” (a subspecies of the economists), have had their go at conflict issues. Their 
main chore in the post-colonial world, concurrent with the era of development, has been to think 
about the gap that separates the rich from the poor nations and to develop strategies to overcome 
this skew. The civil war issue has assumed particular priority because violence has turned out to be 
correlated with poverty.
7
 
A global public body such as the World Bank was created to provide the necessary finance. But 
also the individual national states have, from the very beginning, taken interest in managing the 
“underdeveloped” countries' affairs. In the era of globalization, economic interconnectedness has 
alerted the rich countries' leaders to the necessity of securing stability and fostering economic 
growth in other parts of the world.
8
 
Some argue that helping the wretched and the poor is a moral duty for any responsible individual 
and state. And in fact, the debate on civil war in public international law has brought forth the con-
cept of “responsibility to protect”.9 
Others say that rich nations are merely interested in preserving and augmenting their wealth. De-
velopment interventions would thus be but a smokescreen to conceal tough economic agendas. 
One thing is certain, that economies and societies are intensely interdependent and that a fair 
share of the resources relevant to the industrialized nations' productive cycles originate from outside 
their borders. Any act of altruism in the global world is therefore linked with benefits. 
In what seems a curious parallel, this two-fold view (idealism/humanism versus opportun-
ism/self-interest/egotism) applies to the inner logic of conflicts, too. There are reasons why individ-
uals (and, on a larger scale, peoples) decide to engage in rebellion. Given my preliminary considera-
                                                 
6SMALL and Singer (1982, p.210), quoted in SAMBANIS (2004), p. 816 
7cf. COLLIER, The bottom billion, 2007 
8For an account of development policies and strategies see MCMICHAEL, Development and social change, 2008. 
9See the recent article by former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect Comes of Age, 
available at http://theutopianblog.tumblr.com/post/11980029501/the-responsibility-to-protect-comes-of-age 
(accessed on October 31, 2011). 
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tions, questions are: Are rebels driven by a visceral sentiment that stems from some kind of depriva-
tion or from the prospect of gaining material wealth? Or are they cool-headed entrepreneurs who 
assess risks and opportunities and, depending on expected outcomes, decide whether to rebel? In 
other words, are they plagued by grievances and driven by greed? (And what inconsistencies may 
there be between their declared motives and the goals they actually pursue?) Or do they act on op-
portunities that make rebellion feasible? 
The debate in point has been carried out among the community of political scientists and econo-
mists working on civil war issues. In this chapter I will first explain the two perspectives of motiva-
tional hypotheses – greed and grievance theory – and give an outline of the positions advocated by 
the debate's protagonists. I will then go on to introduce feasibility theory as proposed by Collier et 
al. (2006). 
Grievance and greed theory both work with gnostic categories in keeping with psychoanalysis, 
whereas the feasibility approach resorts to explanations that are behaviouristic in kind. All three are 
policy narratives, i.e. toolboxes containing a consistent set of explanations for the behaviour of 
groups involved in violent conflict. 
Quantitative research is done under all three premises and often with the same methodological 
protocols. The Gini coefficient as a means of measuring distribution inequality, for example, is used 
to detect objective grievances (measuring income or asset inequality), but at the same time it serves 
as a proxy for a feasibility variable such as government efficacy (when used to measure population 
dispersion). 
Chapters three and four will focus on proxy variables and the values they typically assume. Let 
us for now clarify the exact meaning of the terms grievance, greed and feasibility. 
2.1 GRIEVANCE 
Political science, as that branch of scholarship that accumulates knowledge about the polis, has 
traditionally viewed civil conflicts as arising from a “root cause” that translates into perceived and 
objective grievances and makes rebellion desirable. This theory is readily backed by the rhetoric of 
insurgent parties, who usually stress the grievances inflicted upon them and depict themselves as 
liberators of their people from burdens such as colonial rule or despotic governance. 
A classic example is the tale of a righteous people that decides to engage in a just, though tire-
some struggle to overcome repression, despotism and imperialist rule in order to be free at last. 
2.1.1 OBJECTIVE GRIEVANCES 
Grievances are objective when they can be accounted for empirically. If perceived by the popu-
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lace, they may translate into subjective grievances. However, they don't always necessarily do so. 
Economic hardship and inequality are important grievance factors and so is state violence. Bad or 
irresponsible governance, corruption, embezzlement and the occurrence of electoral frauds have in 
the past attracted attention, too. Civil liberties, freedom of expression and the right to participation 
may not be forgotten either and the number of political prisoners in a country is another proxy for 
objective grievances though this points us to a weak spot in grievance theory, which I will discuss in 
a moment. 
2.1.2 SUBJECTIVE GRIEVANCES 
Grievances are subjective when they are perceived by the individual. They may arise from some 
objective grievance but may also be the result of misrepresentations of the social reality. 
Relative deprivation matters both in its material aspect and in terms of missing opportunities. In-
dividuals perceive that they are worse off than others and think that this is unfair. In order to end the 
state of injustice, they are ready to engage in resistance. 
Discrimination is an example. It can occur on the basis of sex, race, language, religion, political 
opinions, and personal or social conditions
10
 and can become manifest in legal provisions (e.g. 
apartheid or racial segregation) or social custom (prejudice, racial hatred, etc.). It may affect the 
individual or the group, who are discriminated against, directly through violence or indirectly 
through denied opportunities. More recently the “digital divide” has been discussed as a new source 
of discrimination. 
Some grievances are difficult to class, since they have both subjective and objective elements. 
2.1.3 PROBLEMS WITH GRIEVANCE THEORY 
A strong point against grievance is the “propaganda allegation”, i.e. the claim that rebellious 
groups set up rhetorical smokescreens in order to conceal their true motives. Talking of political 
prisoners, for example, it is sometimes difficult to establish justice. 
In his 2010 The Shah Milani depicts the case of the monarchy in Iran: 
“A good example of how the Shah and the opposition approached political questions can be found in 
the issue of political prisoners. The opposition outlandishly claimed that Iran had 'hundreds of thou-
sands of political prisoners', whereas the actual number was closer to 4,000. […] On the other hand, 
for years, when the Western media asked the Shah about the plight of political prisoners and torture in 
Iran, [he] invariably dismissed the question by saying Iran had no political prisoners, only crimi-
nals.”
11
 
                                                 
10This short list is taken from article 3 of the Italian Constitution. Modern discrimination discourse, though, has 
progressed  considerably and developed concepts such as gender and identity discrimination and discrimination 
based on ethnicity rather than race. 
11MILANI, The Shah, 2010, p.319 
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If observers rely solely on the parties' accounts, they will hardly arrive at a realistic understand-
ing of the nature of a particular conflict. In the past this was a problem especially when conflicts 
occurred in remote corners of the world. The little evidence that made it from the periphery to the 
centre could be biased and partial depending on the necessities of the moment and of who conveyed 
the news. 
The era of global media coverage – some optimistically conjectured – was to resolve this prob-
lem thanks to a capillary, viral network of instant information exchange connecting people from all 
over the world.
12
 And in part this has come true. We have seen an empowerment of the global civil 
society. 
Yet there is consensus among observers that the development also brought with it some severe 
setbacks. Today the huge amount of news available makes it difficult to distinguish authentic from 
biased reporting. As to conflict coverage, parties usually try to exploit the media attention for their 
purposes. Thus, false reports are spread around the world within minutes and the fact that it is close 
to impossible to stop or correct a piece of false news once they circulate can be partially attributed 
to the blurred dimensions of the virtual public space.
13
 
[BOX 1] BIASED! – SOME NOTES ON TRUSTWORTHINESS 
With the readers' permission, I shall try a little digression on the methodological topic of 
trustworthiness: 
In the case illustrated by Milano how can observers arrive at a non-random
14
 conclusion about 
a probable range of SAVAK activities, when the accounts provided by the actors differ so largely. 
Now in reality, Milani in the quoted passage already qualifies the information he gives. He dis-
misses opposition claims as “exaggerated” and “outlandish” and reports the “true” figures dis-
closed to him by a certain Emad Baghi, whom he introduces as “one of Iran's leading human 
rights activists and an opponent of the death penalty”.15 
In other words, he makes an appeal to authority by presenting an outside interlocutor with 
qualities such as to back up his own judgement about the two contending parties' interpretations. 
This is a device well known to rhetoricians and it is exactly the kind of expedient scholars use 
when they use indirectly provided information. They weight their sources. 
But even the appeal to authority can obviously be biased. Typically scholars will have a certain 
pool of information readily available and habitually refer to outside sources when they need extra 
input. Their range of outside sources, however, is heavily influenced by habits, knowledge and 
work environment. 
Consider, for example, that my sociological reading of the Iranian society has been substantial-
                                                 
12See the recent shift in the meaning of the English adjective “viral”, now denoting “an image, video, piece of 
information, etc. that is circulated rapidly and widely from one Internet user to another” (OED). “Viral marketing” 
and “go viral” are two such newfangled expressions. 
13Another issue is resilience. Under ordinary circumstances modern means of communication are able to supply the 
above services to the global public. But as soon as a national government decides to interfere with its functioning by 
shutting down the telecommunications network or internet in their country, the world is reminded of just how 
vulnerable these new instruments still are. 
14Difficult to choose the adjective that fits here! Is it “correct” or rather “justified” or “reasonable” or what? 
15MILANI, p.471 
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ly influenced by the ideas of Mrs Felicetta Ferraro, a former cultural attachée at the Italian em-
bassy in Iran. On Iranian history, on the other hand, I read a biography of the last Shah by Milani, 
a California-based senior expert on Iranian politics. Now the interesting fact is that it was Ferraro 
who alerted me to the book, which she herself has positively reviewed. 
To what degree this actually determines basic features of my analysis is difficult to assess and 
also depends on the breadth of my general reading. In this paper, the accent is more on a data-
backed economic analysis, thus alleviating the urgency of the issue. 
Generally, however, it is to be expected that intellectual cross-fertilization, or the “parochial 
professional bias”16, plays an important role in shaping the scholar's stance and has to be taken 
heed of. Diversification and disclosure of sources are the most effective remedy. 
Coming back, finally, to the above example, I would like to add that the observations concern-
ing political prisoners do not round up the question once and for all because in the case of secret 
service abductions and killings there is another line to the argument. One could simply argue that 
“any political prisoner is one too many”, and dismiss the rest of the debate. 
2.2 GREED 
Because of the intrinsic bias susceptibility of the grievance theory (“Which side are you on?”), 
scholars have developed other possible explanations for rebellion. They turned away from the root 
causes and started viewing rebel groups as social entrepreneurs driven by prospects of profit. Many 
conflict-prone states actually dispose of natural resource riches, which can have a two-fold effect on 
conflict. 
Firstly, a region's natural resource endowment is an incentive to start rebellion and, once started, 
it provides the necessary finance to sustain rebel activities. Rebels may indeed exploit mines or oil 
wells through setting up their own extraction facilities or they may tax the existing operators in the 
mining industry. In both cases the material return on rebellion is huge. 
The Democratic Republic of Congo is the one quintessential example of a state torn by civil war 
due to resource riches. To its very considerable credit, the greed hypothesis has helped to launch 
global campaigning against trade in so-called “conflict diamonds”.17 But also oil, gas and rare earth 
metals play an important role in rebel business.
18
 
Finally, government control itself is a source of attraction for rebels since it allows them to dis-
pose of state funds and to impose taxation on the resident population and the economy. 
Setting out from the greed concept Collier and Hoeffler (2001) developed a model of civil war 
explanation in which they identify a set of statistically relevant variables that cause the onset of vio-
lence:
19
 
1) GDP per capita    → the lower the worse 
                                                 
16HIRSHLEIFER, The Dark Side of the Force, 2001, p.4 
17For reference: http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html 
18cf. ROSS (2005) 
19Table 1 contains more information and an updated set of key variables. 
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2) GDP per capita growth   → the lower the worse 
3) Primary commodity exports → pernicious if high, with a peak at 32% of GDP 
4) Peace duration   → the longer the better 
5) Social fractionalization 
 and ethnic dominance  → play a minor role 
6) Male secondary schooling → the higher the better 
7) Population size   → risk approximately proportional to size 
8) Geographic dispersion 
 of the population   → the lower the better 
 
These variables and their respective influence on civil war onset have resulted from what is 
called a linear regression ran on a set of economic and other data. This is a basic econometric tech-
nique that helps to find correlations between variables. It is important to know that each variable 
has a correlation coefficient that tells us something about the direction and the magnitude of the 
change the independent variable may induce in the dependent one (in this case civil war onset). 
Secondly, the level of statistic significance indicates how well the theoretical correlation fits the 
actual observations. 
For interpretation consider that a negative coefficient means that an increase in the independent 
variable will decrease the risk of civil war onset, whereas with a positive coefficient an increase in 
the independent will engender higher conflict risk. As for significance, three stars are optimum but 
still a single star is commonly held to stand for a robust finding. We will see this in table 1. 
Another question is the interpretation of the correlations. In many cases this can be very ambigu-
ous. Possible alternative readings of individual variables that have found support among researchers 
are discussed throughout the rest of this work. For now we may notice that this set combines both 
greed and grievance factors but finds evidence that the greed side influences the outcome to a much 
greater extent. The paper's publication in 2001 sparked what has come to be known as the “greed-
versus-grievance debate”. 
2.3 FEASIBILITY 
Since its publication, there has been an intense production of academic papers that refer to Colli-
er and Hoeffler (2001) more or less directly. New and different sets of significant variables have 
been proposed. What I am interested in pointing out is that Collier et al. (2006), revisiting the earlier 
work, arrive at a new “basic division between theories of civil war”: those that focus on feasibility, 
and those that focus on motivation. Motivation is the sphere where greed and grievance are collo-
cated.
20
 
                                                 
20COLLIER et al. (2006), p.6 
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Arguing that no “special inducements in terms of motivation” are needed in order to incite rebel-
lion, they introduce the so-called “feasibility hypothesis”, which proposes that 
“[...] where rebellion is feasible it will occur: motivation is indeterminate, being supplied by whatever 
agenda happens to be adopted by the first social entrepreneur to occupy the viable niche.”
21
 
This somewhat reductionist approach draws on the epistemology of economics which, in Col-
lier's  words, “tend[s] to set little credence on the explanations which people give for their behavior, 
preferring to work by 'revealed preference'”.22 
What characterizes this method is its pragmatic way of leaving out of consideration motivational 
explanations of group behaviour. As anticipated above, we have here an example of the theoretical 
stance of behaviourism in civil war studies.
23
 
As in all areas of life, so in civil war studies, there is the old and the new, there are theories that 
come in a quaint, grandfatherly guise and those that are wrapped in stylish and fashionable state-of-
the-art cloth. Collier et al. (2006), combining feasibility and motivation in a single model of civil 
war causation, decidedly place themselves at the centre of what in their view is a major innovation 
in civil war theory. 
“Whereas traditional political analyses either assumed or asserted some particular 'root cause' of civ-
il war, usually traced to a historical grievance, modern economic theory focuses on the feasibility of 
rebellion as well as its motivation.”
24
 
Chapter 3 – The Collier-Hoeffler model – an influential theory of 
feasibility 
Although with the introduction of the feasibility hypothesis, Collier et al. (2006) have adopted a 
different conceptual frame for explaining civil war causation, their analysis of time series data basi-
cally yields the same significant variables as before. The only difference with respect to previous 
publications is that the updated COW data set allows them to improve their model's predictive per-
formance including three significant variables hitherto omitted. 
Table 1 contains these variables along with their correlation coefficients and levels of signifi-
cance (see section 2.2). 
Variable Proxied by 
(if not already a proxy itself) 
Correlation 
coefficient 
Level of 
significance 
GDP per capita ln(GDP per capita) -0.203 * 
                                                 
21ibid., pp.19f. 
22COLLIER (2006), p.4 
23Feasibility might even appear mechanistic in that it depicts insurgents as criminal entrepreneurs and likens their 
endeavour to an enterprise conducted according to economic principles: “The sense of grievance may be based upon 
some objective grounds for complaint, or it may be conjured up by massaging prejudices. However, while this 
distinction is morally interesting to observers – is the cause just? – it is of no practical importance.” (ibid., p.3) 
24ibid., p.4 
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GDP per capita growth (t-1)  -0.145 *** 
Primary commodity exports 
(proportion of GDP) 
 7.133 * 
 '' PCE squared -14.058 * 
Years of peace  -0.057 *** 
Former French African colony dummy -1.020 * 
Social fractionalization Index (ranging from 0 to 1) 2.323 *** 
Proportion of young men of age 15-
29 in total population 
 17.423 * 
Total population ln(population) 0.284 *** 
Mountainous (proportion of total 
land area) 
Index (Gerrard & Fearon) 0.015 * 
Table 1: Significant variables and their correlation coefficients in Collier et al. (2006) 
3.1 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
“To predict a civil war it is surely more useful to focus on near-term indicators such as political inci-
dents and rising violence. Rather, our model is useful in pointing to the typical structural risks and so 
provides some guidance on longer term policies for prevention.”25 
The intense learned debate, as I have pointed out, springs from concern about the yet pervasive 
phenomenon of violent conflicts in the world and is an attempt at finding policies that may effec-
tively help to contain the detrimental consequences of civil war. Its protagonists are also chief polit-
ical advisers. 
Paul Collier, for example, was Director of the Research Development Department of the World 
Bank, where he collaborated with Nicholas Sambanis. James D. Fearon helps prepare World Bank's 
annual World Development Reports.
26
 All three are authors whose works I quote. 
Collier's views have also left the narrow realm of scholarly debate and entered global public dis-
course. In his 2007 popular science book, The bottom billion: why the poorest countries are failing 
and what can be done about it, he outlines and concretizes the policy strategies suggested by his 
findings. The central point he makes is about the so-called poverty traps: Overabundance of natural 
riches provides governments with easy revenue, which is then stashed away by corrupt elites in-
stead of being invested in favour of sustained growth. Add the destructive potential of violent con-
flict to top it all. 
Collier's aim is to “set things straight”, i.e. to overcome public misperception and to alert the 
world to the fact that “[g]rievance is to a rebel organization what image is to a business.”27 
                                                 
25ibid., p.7 
26I found biographical notes on Collier here: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/ (accessed on October 27, 2011) and on 
Sambanis here: http://www.yale.edu/polisci/people/nsambanisCV.pdf (accessed on October 27, 2011). 
27COLLIER (2006), p.2 
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3.2 CRITIQUE 
Not all of the variables the model argues for are universally accepted. For example, no sooner 
had Collier and Hoeffler (2001) presented their findings to the learned public than James D. Fearon 
of Stanford University stepped in criticizing one of their central interpretations. He argues that 
“oil predicts civil war risk not because it provides an easy source of rebel start-up finance, but proba-
bly because oil producers have relatively low state capabilities given their level of per capita in-
come”.28 
Also readers might wonder, quite comprehensibly, what has become of such important items as 
human rights that have been in the focus of global public debate for a fair share of years now. 
Fearon (2010) argues that “very poor human rights performance is a very bad sign for a govern-
ment: major civil conflict is then much more likely to begin, if it has not already started.”29 
He studies the lagged effect of state repression using Gibney et al.'s (2008) Political Terror Scale. 
However, it has to be noted that his findings are compromised by risk of endogeneity and unclear 
interpretation.
30
 
A common problem of all economic accounts of civil war causation is the so-called spurious re-
gression (or reverse causation). As for political terror, so for economic growth, the direction of the 
causal nexus cannot always be established with certainty. Does low growth really cause violence, or 
is poor economic performance itself a consequence of a minatory situation that prefigures violence 
and hampers investment but is caused by a totally different factor? Collier (2006) and Hegre and 
Sambanis (2006) tackle this question. 
 
SECOND PART 
Chapter 4 – Iran and feasibility 
The intriguing thing about these political science endeavours is that they eventually contribute to 
an understanding of real actual situations and may yield practical advice as to what to do to prevent 
violence (assuming that research premises are correct). In this second part of my work I would 
therefore like to discuss a case in point, the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the light of feasibility theory. 
4.1 THE IMPACT OF CHANGE ON CIVIL CONFLICT 
In my analysis I set out from an observation on political change and its effect on civil war onset. 
                                                 
28FEARON (2004), p.1 
29FEARON (2010), p.24 
30In Fearon's words the lagged PTS “is picking up incipient or residual civil war activity”. This means that a high level 
of political terror may be due to a state's having begun to enact policies of counterinsurgency that do not yet reach 
the threshold of civil war. In that case, the political terror would not be the cause of the conflict, but rather a 
symptom (ibid., pp.23ff.). 
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After that I will immediately turn to the specific context of Iran. 
[BOX 2] REVOLUTION, REFORM, REACTION – SOME NOTES ON CHANGE 
In this concise and slightly peculiar round-up of the typologies of institutional political change 
I build on Fearon (2003) who suggests that there is “a strong relationship between changes in 
governing institutions […] and an increased probability of civil war onset in subsequent years”.31 
Regardless of direction – whether it moves the system towards more autocracy or more democra-
cy – change causes friction and may cause conflict to erupt. 
Why is it that changes in the set-up of an established political system – for the worse or for the 
better – have this effect? I argue that change occurs at any time on the societal level and that this 
poses a threat to any established order in that it creates a gap between social realities and legal 
provisions. A country's stability, therefore, hinges strongly on its political system's capacity of 
keeping up with those inevitable changes. 
There are different degrees to the intensity of political change. We can roughly distinguish be-
tween revolution, reform and reaction. 
A revolution generally shatters the foundations of a state and implements a new order. By defi-
nition, it causes the most radical and far-reaching change, though at times what is referred to as a 
revolution can be a mere mockery of innovation (if it limits itself to replacing bodies and faces 
without changing general political lines). 
Reform is moderate and progressive change implemented by institutional means over time. It 
does not compromise the deep structure of a society in the short term. 
Finally reaction – associated with conservative ideas of maintaining the status quo and safe-
guarding traditional values – is the kind of silent anti-revolution and anti-reform which opposes 
change in the name of invariance (rather than continuity). 
As to reaction my argument goes that, despite its apparently immobile stance, reaction actually 
carries out a precise programme of change through imposition because it counteracts innovations 
that would otherwise inevitably occur in the societal body. Hence, it is to be considered – some-
what counter to intuition – a vectorial, not a scalar, measure of opposition to inevitable innova-
tions over time. This has some bearing on the analysis of the Iranian case. 
All this points us to a dynamic understanding of peace as a system's capacity to keep pace with 
societal changes, neither erring on the side of caution (reaction), nor enforcing change all to hasti-
ly (radical reform). 
 
As to the perspectives of change – revolution, reform and reaction – Iran has known all three of 
them in its recent past. We can roughly date the revolutionary phase from early 1978 to 1979
32
, fol-
lowed by a reactionary period that saw the consolidation of the new order and ran from mid-1979 to 
the late 1980s. The years 1998 till 2004 have come to be known as the reform period due to political 
power being vested in the so-called “enlightened clerics”. And finally, “Iran reversed the course of 
democratic reforms and tightened autocratic control in 2004”.33 
                                                 
31FEARON (2010), p.25. See also FEARON and Laitin (2003). 
32For a masterful account of the Iranian revolution see KAPUŚCIŃSKI, Shah of Shahs, 1985. 
33Marshall and Cole (2009), p.10 
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These developments are reflected in illustration 1, which is taken from the Polity IV project's 
website. Data are coded as follows: 
“The 'Polity Score' captures [the] regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (he-
reditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity scores can also be converted to re-
gime categories: we recommend a three-part categorization of 'autocracies' (-10 to -6), 'anocracies' (-
5 to +5 […]), and 'democracies' (+6 to +10).”34 
In keeping with what is said about friction and the inescapability of change in box 2, we have to 
assume that since 1982 – the date of the last recorded outbreak of mass violence35 – politics have 
served the needs of the people. This, however, alerts us to the inadequacy of a similar way of meas-
uring social friction. We only have a binary indicator: either there is utter friction that amounts to 
civil war or something that is smaller, but whose dimension we can only guess at.
36
 
Since guessing is not a scientifically sound method of acquiring knowledge, we can refer to em-
pirical research work done by others (as I have done above with the illustration on authority devel-
opments) or we can try and track down bits of evidence. This method has me looking at the coun-
try's recent history. 
                                                 
34http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (accessed on November 4, 2011) 
35Reference is to the “Iran vs. Mujaheddin” war as accounted for by Gleditsch (2004). 
36I tackle this problem in depth in section 4.4. 
Illustration 1: Polity IV Authority Trends chart, Iran, 1946-2010 
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4.2 TRACKING DOWN FRICTION 
In 2009 even unwitting observers from the outside could conclude that there was something go-
ing on in the streets of major Iranian cities. Thanks not least to the “viral” communication technolo-
gies (see section 2.1.3), news about protests over an alleged electoral fraud spread around the world. 
In this paper I do not aim at establishing the truth about the allegations. What I do is I take the 
protests as a precious indicator that might point to the existence of a “viable niche” for rebellion. 
4.3 VIABLE NICHES 
If there are indications that current politics in Iran serve the needs of maintaining internal stabil-
ity ineffectively and insufficiently, some might – in my view quite rightly – argue that there must be 
a gap between people's expectations and the state agenda. But since I want to lay emphasis on the 
structuralist part of the research design, I try to understand what might be the structural features of 
Iran's society that cause this gap. 
4.3.1 A PEOPLE OF YOUNG ROVERS? 
Of special statistic interest is that part of the population that is most susceptible of taking the re-
bel road, i.e. in Collier et al.'s (2006) approximation young males aged 15-29. 
I find that 17.89 per cent of Iranians belong to this group.
37
 This is an extraordinarily large pro-
portion as we shall see in a moment. Tables 2-6 contain data from Collier et al. (2006). The column 
“sample mean” contains the mean value of the variable throughout the whole data set, i.e. for all 
countries in all periods observed. “Peace mean” is the mean value of this variable in all country 
periods where there was no war onset, whereas “war start mean” denotes the mean of those coun-
tries and periods that witnessed a war start. 
In table 2 this is to say that in countries with a war start for a given year, in average, the share of 
young men in the total population was 13.1 per cent. The peacetime observations, on the other hand, 
had an average of 12.9 per cent of young men in their total population. The positive coefficient tells 
us that the greater the share, the higher the risk of conflict.
38
 
 Iran Sample 
mean 
Peace 
mean 
War start 
mean 
Correlation 
coefficient 
Level of 
significance 
Proportion of young men of 
age 15-29 in total population 
17.89% 12.90% 12.90% 13.10% 17.423 * 
Table 2: Proportion of young men (15-29) – Source: United Nations (2008 census) 
Clearly, none of the samples comes anywhere close to matching Iran's share of young people. 
                                                 
37UN Data from 2008 census: 12.6 million on a total population of 70.5 million. 
38The table rows will be introduced piecemeal through tables 2-6. See appendix E for the complete table. In appendix C, 
I disclose my data sources. 
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The country is an extreme outlier with respect to both peace and war means, which happen to nearly 
coincide. When we consider that the correlation is such that “a doubling in the proportion of the 
population […] increases the risk of conflict from 4.7 per cent to 31.9 per cent.”39, in terms of civil 
war probability for Iran this is very remarkable! 
This somehow drastic appraisal, however, is mitigated by a special feature of the Iranian young 
population, namely their high level of education. I arrive at that after having a look at who these 
young people are. 
For this purpose I introduce the view of Felicetta Ferraro, a senior Italian expert on Iran and for 
eight years cultural attachée at the Italian embassy in the country. In her words 
“[these] are youth who have experienced neither the ideological drive nor the fervour of the revolu-
tion, nor have they known the hardships of war. But they have gone through the enthusiasm of reform, 
which has strongly shaped their attitudes. Today they find themselves on the margins of a difficult 
phase of transition and of real political struggle and their future is threatened by the consequences of 
economic crisis.”40 
Against the background of Iran's contemporary history the under-thirty figure assumes particular 
significance because it is a proxy for that part of the population born after the 1979 revolutionary 
events and who have therefore not participated of the political turmoil of those days. 
This leads us to another of our key variables, namely peace duration. There is strong evidence 
that the risk of civil war onset decreases with the duration of peace periods. This is due to what Col-
lier and Hoeffler (2001) describe as the depreciation of conflict-specific capital.
41
 
Quite banally, weapons and other military paraphernalia deteriorate over time. Also can expertise 
be lost in oblivion or through the deaths of key figures, which altogether raises the cost of rebellion. 
The negative coefficient tells us that conflict risk is all the lower the longer peace has lasted. In 
comparison with sample means, this time Iran is “on the safe side”. 
 Iran Sample 
mean 
Peace 
mean 
War start 
mean 
Correlation 
coefficient 
Level of 
significance 
Years of Peace 29 32 33 16 -0.057 *** 
Table 3: Peace duration – Source: Gleditsch (2004) 
This appraisal is supported by Iran's educational performance. In a previous version of Collier's 
model male secondary schooling, in place of the proportion of young men in the total population, 
was used to proxy the opportunity cost of rebellion. The latter is higher when education levels – and 
with it earning perspectives – are higher. “A country which has ten percentage points more of its 
                                                 
39COLLIER et al. (2006), p.15 
40This and the following quotations are excerpts from a speech Ferraro gave in occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of 
the Islamic Revolution on 11 February 2009. The audio is available at 
http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/272562/iran-1979-la-rivoluzione-islamica-trentanni-dopo (accessed on 
November 1, 2011). I provide the Italian-language transcript in appendix A. All translations are mine. 
41COLLIER and Hoeffler (2001), p.5 
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youths in schools – say 55% instead of 45% – cuts its risk of conflict from 14% to around 10%.”42 
Iran's population is highly educated. At 85.26%
43
, male secondary schooling is among the highest 
not only for that region of the world (+10.38% relative to the MENA states) but also with respect to 
income levels (+22.5% relative to middle income states, +4.92% relative to upper middle income 
states). 
In terms of conflict risk this is remarkable. According to feasibility theory, education raises the 
opportunity cost of rebellion because it is to be expected that highly educated young men have well-
paid jobs and that relinquishing these would be quite a sacrifice for them. However, this assumption 
has to be counterchecked. 
If, for example, the economic situation of the population is dire and there is high juvenile unem-
ployment, this would lower the opportunity cost and weaken education's positive effect on conflict 
risk. 
Borrowing a Collier quip we might say that, unsurprisingly, just like a “[w]ar cannot be fought 
just on hopes or hatreds”44, a man cannot survive just on a cardboard diploma. 
World Bank data give 20.2 per cent unemployment among Iranian males aged 15 to 24. We only 
have limited data to compare this figure to other countries or regions (see appendix D). However, a 
few comparisons reveal that in 2008 juvenile unemployment in Iran was 28 per cent higher than in 
the Euro area, 42 per cent relative to North America, and 72 per cent relative to Latin America.
45
 
At this point the gap between people's expectations and the way the system serves them comes to 
the fore again. There is disparity between the huge potential and the scarcity of opportunities. If not 
a direct factor in triggering rebellious moves, it does certainly shape perceptions and would be of 
interest for a motivation-centred reading of the Iranian case. 
4.3.2 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Linked with the above discourse on education and unemployment is the question of GDP per 
capita.  A country's level of income is another important variable that determines the opportunity 
cost of rebellion. 
Iran is a middle or upper middle income country. GDP per capita in 2009 was $2,162.
46
 Since 
Collier et al.'s dataset puts 1997 as base year for calculating real GDP, I need to convert these into 
                                                 
42COLLIER (2006), p.6 
43The first figure related here is gross male secondary school enrolment in 2009 and is taken from the World Bank 
Development Indicators database. Note that comparisons are expressed as relative change, i.e. not as difference in 
percentage points. More complete statistics can be found in appendix B. 
44COLLIER (2006), p.3 
45A side note for my Italian readers: Male juvenile unemployment in 2009 was 23.3 per cent for Italy, 39.1 for Spain. 
46World Bank Development Indicators (in constant 2000 US$) 
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constant 1997 US$. Applying the conversion factor 0.932
47
 and using the natural logarithm yields 
the following result. 
 Iran Sample 
mean 
Peace 
mean 
War start 
mean 
Correlation 
coefficient 
Level of 
significance 
ln(GDP per capita) 7.608 8.604 8.659 7.003 -0.203 * 
Table 4: GDP per capita – Source: World Bank 
Compared with the war start sample mean, Iran's level of income is about 83% higher ($2,015 
against approx. $1,100). Considering that “in a hypothetical country with characteristics set at the 
sample mean” the predicted risk is increased from 4.7 to 5.4 per cent if “the level of per capita in-
come is halved”48, Iran's reference value seems relatively stable. Yet it is still considerably inferior 
to the peace sample mean of approximately $5,760. 
 
Illustration 2 shows GDP per capita growth over the last decade. Iran has continuously been 
above world average and for most of the time keeps clear of the war sample mean, which is nega-
tive at around -0.5 per cent. However, recently there has been a decline in growth rates first to 1.1 
per cent in 2008, then down to 0.6 in 2009. 
 Iran Sample 
mean 
Peace 
mean 
War start 
mean 
Correlation 
coefficient 
Level of 
significance 
GDP per capita growth 0.62% 1.84% 2.01% -0.49% -0.145 *** 
                                                 
47World Bank figures are in constant 2000 US$, whereas Collier assumes 1997 as base year. See conversion table at 
http://oregonstate.edu/cla/polisci/download-conversion-factors 
48COLLIER et al. (2006), p.9 
Illustration 2: GDP per capita growth (in %) - Source: World Bank 
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Table 5: GDP per capita growth – Source: World Bank 
Thus the country's economy joins a global trend of recession, which – if the above hypotheses 
apply – would have the world as a whole inch closer towards violent conflict. Certainly this is a real 
threat for the most vulnerable contexts. Yet how large its influence on Iran, is difficult to assess 
since growth, too, is correlated with other variables. 
In addition we have to distinguish the effect of general recession from that caused by the ongoing 
sanctions imposed by both the international community and the United States, in particular. These 
measures are already taking their toll on the country's economy hampering growth in targeted sec-
tors.
49
 
Crude oil is Iran's primary export commodity. In the graph below we see oil rents as a percentage 
of GDP. I add a line representing dynamics of the oil price to quickly check for correlations. In the 
last decade the proportion of oil rents has constantly been between 20 and 40 per cent of GDP with 
two peaks at 38.0 and 37.7 per cent in 2006 and 2008 respectively. 2009 has seen a drastic decline. 
By the end of the year oil rents made up only 21.4 per cent of GDP. 
The role of primary commodity exports is controversial when it comes to civil war risk. Collier 
and Hoeffler (2001) find evidence for high risk in countries whose economy is based on extraction 
and export. Their calculations suggest that the “risk of conflict peaks when they constitute around 
                                                 
49Dispute is over Iran's nuclear programme. See UN Security Council's resolutions no. 1696 (2006), 1737(2006), 1747 
(2007), 1929 (2010) and 1984(2011). For the United States' official position see the two recent interviews by 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on BBC Persian and Voice of America (see Appendix F for links). 
Illustration 3: Iran's oil rents and OPEC basket price – Source: World Bank and OPEC 
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32% of GDP”.50 
Fearon (2004) calls attempts to explain this result “contortions”51 and suggests concentrating on 
oil (rather than general primary commodities) because using a slightly different methodology, which 
should have no bearing on the outcome, he finds that “the apparent impact of primary commodity 
exports largely evaporates.”52 He suggests that 
“[p]erhaps primary commodity exports appear to matter not because they indicate rebel financing po-
tential but because they correlate with oil production, which marks state weakness conditional on in-
come.”53 
State weakness of oil (and other primary commodities) exporters is old hat. With oil rents so 
easily available, rentier states do not bother to build up an effective and efficient state apparatus. 
This seems to make them more conflict-prone and exposes them to a series of other risks that are 
discussed in Collier (2007). 
In the above graph it is worth noting that the 2009 oil price drop roughly coincides with the peri-
od of domestic unrest. However, establishing an immediate link between government revenue short-
fall on the one and state capacity on the other hand would be a little too audacious considering the 
brief period of time. Moreover, in 2010 and 2011 the oil price went back up again. 
4.3.3 TERRAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND URBANIZATION 
Iran has a vast territory (about five times the size of Germany) and a relatively low population 
density (45 inhabitants per square kilometre
54
). The overall population of around 75 million
55
, how-
ever, is large and has the country rank eighteenth among all nations. 
 Iran Sample 
mean 
Peace 
mean 
War start 
mean 
Correlation 
coefficient 
Level of 
significance 
Population 73.97 30.20 28.30 56.50 NA NA 
ln(population)   18.12 17.22 17.16 17.85 0.284 *** 
Table 6: Population – Source: United Nations 
The sample means tell us that a country has a greater risk of violent conflict the more populous it 
is. This has been interpreted in terms of scale effects. It is difficult for a state to control a large pop-
ulation 
Collier et al. (2006) argue that 
                                                 
50COLLIER and Hoeffler (2001), p.8 
51FEARON (2004), p.5 
52ibid., p.4. The difference in Fearon is that he considers the dependent and independent variables not in five-year 
blocks like Collier et al. (2006), but in a country-year format, i.e. he does his regressions on annual data. On 
advantages and setbacks of this method see Fearon (2004). 
53ibid., p.9f. 
54World Bank Data, 2010 
55It's 73.9 million on account of the World Bank (2010), 77.9 million according to the CIA World Factbook (July 2011 
estimate). 
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“the coefficient on the log of population is significantly below unity (0.28), so that a doubling of popu-
lation size increases the risk of civil war by only 21 per cent (from 4.7 per cent to 5.7 per cent), which 
is significantly less than double. The most plausible interpretation of this is that there are economies 
of scale in certain basic functions of the state, most notably the deterrence of organized violence.”56 
Some argue that, eventually, the main factors preventing rebellion are government efficacy and a 
strong state. If opportunities are low, the much-cited social entrepreneur won't show up to occupy 
the viable regime change niche. 
With respect to Iran there is anecdotal evidence in support of this argument. The aforementioned 
2009 riots were settled through the massive use of force on the part of the executive. An Iranian 
idiosyncrasy has it that besides government police and military forces there are paramilitary units, 
the basiji, who are backed by the establishment and help to crack down on rebellion (and sometimes 
peaceful opposition). 
Traditionally Iran has a strong central state. Its origins date back to Reza Shah and his son and 
succesor Mohammed Reza Shah's agenda of radical modernization. In countries with a strong cen-
tral state, Fearon (2010) argues, “social support from many sympathetic people”57 is needed in order 
for rebellion to succeed. Whether this is the case in Iran has to be carefully assessed. 
As I have done above with education, once again I would like to resort to a variable that appears 
significant in Collier and Hoeffler (2001) but ceases to do so in Collier et al. (2006), namely popu-
lation dispersion. “[C]ountries with a highly concentrated population have a very low risk of con-
flict, whereas those with a highly dispersed population have a very high risk”58 
I have not been able to reconstruct the dispersion index used by the authors, but I dispose of the 
figures concerning population density and urbanization. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2001), 
“[e]mpirically, prior to war episodes both population density and urbanization are low.”59 I don't 
give exact correlation coefficients since in the authors' later work the significance of these variables 
has not been confirmed. 
 Iran Sample 
mean 
Peace mean War start 
mean 
Correlation 
coefficient 
Level of 
significance 
Population density 45 150 156 62 <0 NA 
Urbanization 70% 45.11% 46.00% 32.70% <0 NA 
Table 7: Population density and urbanization – Source: World Bank 
Again the resulting picture is extremely ambiguous. Iran's high rate of urban dwellers (compare 
the country's 70 per cent in 2010 to the European Union average of 74 per cent) seems to lower the 
risk of war onset. Yet at the same time and due to the vast territory population density is low, even 
                                                 
56COLLIER et al. (2006), p.12 
57FEARON (2010), p.39 
58COLLIER and Hoeffler (2001), p.13 
59COLLIER and Hoeffler (2001), p.5 
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lower than the war start sample mean. 
In Iran there have been troubles linked with regionalism. The Kurds in the country's Northwest 
have a long history of resistance to the central state. Iranian Azerbaijan in 1946 even witnessed a 
temporarily successful secession and in the past clashes between powerful nomad tribes and the 
state led to major crises. 
But what is the link between population dispersion and civil war? When Collier speaks of “econ-
omies of scale in […] the deterrence of organized violence”60 he implies that high population dis-
persion raises the cost of state surveillance because in a metropolitan area one police or military unit 
can control a great number of hypothetical dissidents, whereas in rural areas the ratio is less favour-
able. 
Regions that are out of reach of the central power may become rebels' strongholds. This, in turn, 
points us to another variable, linked with the former, namely the proportion of mountainous terrain 
in a country. 
If rebels find their “safe havens” in remote places inaccessible to government control, then it is to 
be expected that ruggedness of terrain predicts civil war probability in that it raises the cost of gov-
ernment control and lowers the cost of rebellion. This is the line of argument proposed by Collier et 
al. (2006). 
Unfortunately I do not have reliable data concerning Iran's terrain characteristics, not to mention 
the index used by the authors. But a glance at near-term indicators convinces me that in Iran other 
than terrain factors have played a far more important role in recent political incidents. Therefore I 
propose to neglect the variable “mountainous”.61 If rebellion should appear, I argue, it is much more 
likely to “come out of some damned silly thing” in the cities, where 70 per cent of Iranians dwell. 
4.4 FORMS OF VIOLENCE OTHER THAN CIVIL WAR 
At this point of the paper, one might reasonably object that even if the risk of civil war onset is 
reassuringly low according to important parameters, there may be other forms of violence no less 
important. Indeed: 
“Our theory suggests that both grievance as well as economic factors are relevant to the analysis of 
political violence. The failure of the civil war empirical literature to account for this theory, we will 
argue, is the failure of this literature to model civil war as part of an evolving process of political vio-
lence.”62 
Bodea and Elbadawi (2007) are pointing here to an intrinsic weakness of civil war theories. As 
                                                 
60See fn 55. 
61Anther variable of Collier et al.'s model which I neglect for obvious reasons is the “former French African colony” 
dummy. 
62BODEA and Elbadawi (2007), p.23 
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we have already seen, the very way we define a civil war has some bearing on the outcome of statis-
tical analyses. Population size is a significant factor in almost all models of civil war onset not least 
because in a populous country with an on-going conflict the threshold for deaths is more likely to be 
met. 
But civil war is only one particular form of large-scale political violence and alongside it exist a 
whole range of other violent conflict patterns. In the introduction I cited genocide and ethnic cleans-
ing. As to forms of lesser magnitude we may think of coups or politically motivated riots. 
A more comprehensive approach to political violence would 
“view civil conflict as a process that has discrete levels or breakpoints. These begin with low levels of 
protest and proceed through higher levels of rebellion and, finally, if not sufficiently addressed, to civil 
war.”63 
Escalation patterns are very probably driven by both intragroup and intergroup mechanisms. So-
cial psychologists have shown how the process of “deindividuation” can lead to the complete loss 
of responsibility on the part of group members when the environment provides certain triggering 
factors.
64
 The staggering cruelties committed by child soldiers in many wars on the African conti-
nent are an example of how these mechanisms can be exploited for a precise purpose. 
As to intergroup mechanisms, it is said that the Thirty Years' War back in seventeenth-century 
Europe was fought for religious causes, and ethnic antagonism triggered the 1994 Rwandan geno-
cide. Up until today addressing and fomenting religious and ethnic sentiment is part of many a lead-
er's rule-and-divide strategy. 
With respect to Iran we may take a look at the foundations of ethnicity and religion trying to un-
derstand how conflicts are processed and what grievance narratives there are. In ethnic terms Iran's 
society is relatively fractionalized. Table 8 shows its composition according to the CIA World 
Factbook and Ellingsen (2004). 
 CIA World Factbook 
2008 estimate 
Ellingsen 
1995 data 
Persian 61% 51% 
Azeri / Azerbaijani 16% 24% 
Kurd 10% 7% 
Lur / Luri 6% 2% 
Baloch / Balochi 2% 2% 
Arab 2% 3% 
Turkmen and Turkic tribes 2% - 
                                                 
63REGAN and Norton (2005), p.326 
64Zimbardo's “Stanford Prison experiment” is a classic in social psychology. See bibliographical references. 
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Gilaki - 8% 
Other 1% 3% 
Table 8: Ethnic groups in Iran – Source: CIA World Factbook and Ellingsen (2004) 
When it comes to religion, however, we observe great homogeneity. 
 CIA World Factbook 
2008 estimate 
Ellingsen 
2001 data 
Muslim (official) 98% 99.57% 
 Shi'a   - 89%  -  93.89% 
 Sunni  -  9%  -   5.68% 
Other (includes Zoroastrian, 
Jewish, Christian and Baha'i) 
2% 0.43% 
Table 9: Religion in Iran – Source: CIA World Factbook and Ellingsen (2004) 
It is important to note that religious conflict in Iran is less about struggles between religions – 
although the troubles faced by minorities like the Baha'i cannot be neglected – and more about state 
secularity.
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The role of ethnicity (and religion) in civil wars is very contentious. For discussion, readers may 
refer to, among others, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2007), and Fearon and Laitin (2003). Here I 
argue that the traditionally strong and consolidated
66
 Iranian national state has mitigated the fierce-
ness of ethnic conflict. The erstwhile powerful Bakhtiyari and Qashqai nomads, for example, have 
largely been kept out of politics in modern Iran. These considerations lead me to neglect the ethnic 
component of the Iranian conflict. 
But there is another interesting point linked with religion that deserves to be tackled. It is about 
what I shall call “Islam-specific mechanisms of conflict escalation”. Bodea and Elbadawi (2007) 
observe that 
“[p]opular demonstrations involving violence may lead to further violence for a variety of reasons: 
Episodes of violence legitimize future violent contestation of power; Violent rioting and protest signals 
discontent and grievance; Participation in violent riots creates individual experience or even leader-
ship in the practice of violence; Finally, some violent protest may elicit a similarly violent response on 
the side of the government, leading to cycles of violence and repression (Tilly 2003, Moore 1998).”67 
It is quite astonishing how well this description fits the events in the run-up to the 1979 Iranian 
revolution. Back then, violence started on January 9, 1978 when police opened fire on a demonstrat-
ing crowd in the city of Qom. In response, a senior cleric declared “that the traditional forty days of 
mourning were to be observed in all major cities, thereby initiating those cyclical waves of protest 
                                                 
65Nonetheless, readers should be aware that the 2009 protests are far from being a secular movement. See also FERRARO 
(2009): “[The young people of Iran] are Islamic, they are republicans and – as proven by the nuclear question – they 
are nationalists”. 
66Traditionally here means: since the Pahlavi era, when the Iranian state was drastically modernized. 
67BODEA and Elbadawi (2007), p.20 
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and violence which regularly punctuated the course of the following month.”68 
Demonstrators assembled anew in the streets each time the forty-days period was over and the 
government cracked down on protests again leaving even more dead. Thus, after another forty days 
the latest victims could be commemorated. Eventually, protests against his regime assumed intrac-
table dimensions and forced the Shah to flee the country. 
This pattern of escalation, adroitly put to use by protest leaders, can therefore tell us something 
about an Iranian idiosyncrasy in conflict processing that stems from religious customs and is condu-
cive to a circle of violence.
69
 
Surprisingly, observation of the latest post-electoral protest patterns yields the same results and 
supports this view. In June 2009, protests erupted immediately after election results were announced. 
Reports on an alleged electoral fraud in favour of the incumbent president Ahmadinejad spread 
throughout the country and sparked unrest in the major cities. Protests lasted for days and entailed 
mass arrests by the police and eventually there was also the much-feared first victim of state vio-
lence.
70
 
Just as we will by now expect, forty days later, i.e. in late July, another wave of demonstrations 
rolled through the country and led to new clashes between protesters and police. In addition, on 
other religious occasions such as the Shi'ite Ashura mourning or the death of the important reform-
ist cleric Montazeri (both in late December 2009), protesters took advantage of general mobilization 
loudly airing their grievances.
71
 
All this apparently contradicts my above findings about the mass of Iran's active male population 
being bereft of large-scale conflict experience due to their being born after the end of the last civil 
war in their country. Thus, I argue that in Iran organizational knowledge about mass mobilization, 
clearly a form of “conflict-specific capital”, is rooted in religion and has therefore been resistant to 
depreciation. 
In short we can say that there have been opportunities for collective action against the state fa-
voured by religious custom. The situation's further evolution, however, has shown that when popu-
lar action exceeded a certain intensity, the regime was no more willing to accept this threat to au-
thority and therefore cracked down on demonstrations. Hence, the viable niche was not there. 
                                                 
68AVERY et al., From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, 1991, p.292 
69This property of an event whose occurrence affects the dimension of its own causal factors is clearly reminiscent of a 
positive feedback loop in systems theory. 
70The case most largely publicized was probably the death of 20-year-old female protester Neda Agha-Soltan. My 
interest lies not in establishing the truth over – certainly propagandistic-sounding – allegations that the police killing 
was an invention by protesters. What I do is I use the evidence for mass gatherings provided by Western media and 
interpret it in terms of the conflict escalation pattern described in this chapter. 
71In appendix G I provide a brief press review of the events cited. 
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Regan and Norton (2005) explain this in terms of increasing rebellion costs: 
“The difference between protest and rebellion resides not in the size of the action but in the degree of 
threat targeted at the state. […] Therefore, actions on the rebellion scale will be seen as a greater 
threat to the regime, and in response, the regime is likely to increase the cost for those actions.”72 
This might be the exact mechanism we have seen at work in Iran. 
 
Conclusions 
In order to round up my findings I create a new table that assembles the observations of tables 2-
6 and adds a column in which a letter expresses the appraisal each single observation receives in 
terms of conflict risk. If Iran fares “better” relative to the peacetime observations in Collier et al.'s 
(2006) sample, then it receives the highest grade “A”. If, on the other hand, even the countries with 
war starts outperform Iran, then “E” is the corresponding lowest grade denoting high risk. “B”, “C” 
and “D” are intermediate appraisals.73 
 Iran Appraisal Sample 
mean 
Peace 
mean 
War start 
mean 
Corr. 
coeff. 
Level 
of 
sign. 
ln(GDP per capita) 7.608 C
74 8.604 8.659 7.003 -0.203 * 
GDP per capita growth (t-1) 0.62% C 1.84% 2.01% -0.49% -0.145 *** 
Years of Peace 29 B 32 33 16 -0.057 *** 
Proportion of young men of age 15-29 
in total population 
17.89% E 12.90% 12.90% 13.10% 17.423 * 
Population 73.97 E 30.20 28.30 56.50 0.284 *** 
 
75
Male secondary schooling 85.26% A 43.42% 44.39% 30.30% NA NA 
A=peace mean or better; B=closer to peace mean than to war mean (70-100%); C=30-70%; D=closer to war mean than 
to peace mean (0-30%); E=war mean or worse 
Table 10: Appraisal of Iran's conflict risk by key variables 
This table summarizes my findings. We see both positive and negative evaluations. The long-
lasting (relative) peace in the country and its high educational achievements let the civil war option 
appear remote. Population size and the mass of young, potentially disillusioned, males, however, 
shed a different light on the situation. Oil and gas reserves add to the overall risk as they constitute 
promising “booties” for rebellion. But we should bear in mind that they do also provide the neces-
sary state finance for repression.
76
 
                                                 
72REGAN and Norton (2005), p.328 
73More precisely I calculate the percentage attained by Iran on a scale delimited by war means on the lower and peace 
means on the upper end: x = (iran – war mean) / (peace mean – war mean). 
74This becomes “D” when taking actual values instead of the natural logarithm. 
75This variable's statistical significance has not been confirmed by COLLIER et al. (2006). 
76Some argue that Iran's state capability hinges largely on oil and gas rents and that international price shocks may 
easily have disastrous effects. In this paper I have not investigated this perspective. 
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We have seen that every war has its narrative and its social entrepreneurs, who always have dis-
tinct characters. The feasibility concept may feel strangely unworldly in this respect. It appears as 
an attempt to remain super partes. This is understandable in so far as it is important not to be influ-
enced by propaganda when trying to correctly assess a conflict. 
The model regains conspicuous practicality when applied to a real context, such as the Islamic 
republic of Iran. The picture that emerges is a dynamic understanding of the conditions necessary to 
maintain a political system in a stable state. Civil war, sadly, can be a stable state, too, and this 
points us to the extraordinary importance of understanding its mechanisms. 
Feasibility theory, or more in general economic theory of civil war, provides an additional analyt-
ical key for interpreting observations. It does certainly not replace political science or any branch of 
history other than the economic one. To predict from which nest the rebellious hornets will eventu-
ally spring is extremely complex if not impossible, and it probably affords a Bismarck understand-
ing of all levels of politics. Yet even the Lord Chancellor, in terms of precision, did not make the 
mother of all predictions. Still, to look at existing nests from different angles, as I have tried to do in 
this paper, is certainly most useful.  
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Appendix 
APPENDIX A 
“Iran 1979. La Rivoluzione Islamica … trent'anni dopo” – Panel di esperti organizzato 
dall'Institute for Global Studies - School of Government , Roma (11 febbraio 2009) 
Intervento di Felicetta Ferraro, già addetta culturale all'ambasciata d'Italia a Tehran: 
“Quella iraniana è una realtà complessa e multiforme, difficile da comprendere soprattutto non 
vivendo nel paese. Bisogna, però, dire che effettivamente la persistenza di pregiudizi, che sono 
ormai dei veri e propri stereotipi, sull'insieme del sistema iraniano appare uno degli ostacoli alla 
comprensione della realtà oggi. 
Come ha scritto di recente uno storico iraniano, in un numero dedicato ai trent'anni della 
rivoluzione, prima del '79 (parla per gli Stati uniti ma credo che valga un po' per tutti) il quadro 
dell'Iran era così positivo che nessuno è stato capace di cogliere i segnali evidenti del crollo che si 
stava avvicinando. Oggi, al contrario, il quadro è così negativo che non si riesce a vedere i progressi 
di una società maturata grazie anche alle dinamiche che la rivoluzione, consapevolmente e non, ha 
messo in atto. 
La trasformazione che ha preso il via nel '79 è stata una trasformazione radicale che ha 
modificato in maniera irreversibile la politica e la società. Le dinamiche del cambiamento sono, 
quindi, strettamente connesse all'evoluzione interna della Repubblica Islamica e  delle sue 
istituzioni ed è da questo punto di vista che vanno osservate. Oggi ne parlerò in maniera veramente 
molto breve mettendo in evidenza soltanto alcuni elementi. 
Il primo fattore che secondo me è molto importante è quello demografico. Nel periodo post-
rivoluzionario la popolazione iraniana è raddoppiata. Sono oggi quasi 74 milioni. Due iraniani su 
tre sono giovani al di sotto dei trent'anni e l'85% di questi giovani ha studiato e in molti casi 
possiedono un titolo di studio avanzato. 
Sono giovani che non hanno sperimentato la spinta ideologica, il fervore della rivoluzione o le 
sofferenze della guerra, ma hanno vissuto l'entusiasmo delle riforme che è stato altamente formativo 
per loro, e vivono oggi, senza potervi partecipare pienamente, una fase difficile di transizione e di 
proprio scontro politico alla quale si aggiungono le conseguenze di una crisi economica che pesa sul 
loro futuro. 
La generazione ancora più giovane, quella diciassettenne/diciottenne, che è massicciamente 
scolarizzata, dimostra chiaramente di voler entrare a pieno titolo nei processi di modernizzazione e 
di globalizzazione sui quali ha una discreta informazione. È una generazione inquieta per i tanti 
diritti che pensa di non aver riconosciuti e che incanala questo disagio in un distacco dalla politica 
che si osserva oggi tra i più giovani, o anche in forme di devianza giovanile: il problema della droga 
è una delle preoccupazioni oggi in Iran. 
Ma è anche una forza che preme per il cambiamento e, come altrove, anche in Iran questi giovani 
la cui vitalità è un dato di fatto riconosciuto da chiunque abbia un po' di familiarità con il Paese, 
vogliono partecipare alla società dei consumi e vogliono aver accesso alla cultura internazionale. 
In realtà, sono queste le loro richieste. 
Nonostante la distanza che una parte di essi proclama dall'Islam ufficiale, il loro ruolo e il loro 
voto sono essenziali per la sopravvivenza del sistema e questo è chiaro a tutti, anche alle forze 
politiche conservatrici che stanno cercando di capire come venire a patti con  questa generazione. 
Frutto dello stesso sviluppo demografico è anche la massiccia presenza femminile nella società 
(la professoressa Mosaffa ne ha parlato adesso). Le donne iraniane hanno assunto un ruolo da 
protagoniste e questo, possiamo dire, paradossalmente proprio grazie alle opportunità che la società 
islamizzata ha loro offerto. Il concetto dello ciador “lascia-passare” è ormai noto. Ed 
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effettivamente l'islamizzazione della società ha legittimato l'ingresso nella scuola e nella vita 
pubblica delle donne appartenenti a famiglie conservatrici, tradizionali e della stessa nomenclatura 
religiosa. 
Inoltre, milioni di ragazze degli strati sociali più bassi e delle campagne hanno usufruito dello 
sviluppo economico delle aree rurali e [di] quelle tribali, che la Repubblica Islamica ha messo 
all'inizio della rivoluzione tra i suoi programmi prioritari, per accedere all'istruzione e al mondo del 
lavoro. Oggi il 66% degli studenti universitari è costituito da donne e le donne sono presenti in 
tutti i settori della società. 
Nello stesso tempo, il tasso di natività si è drasticamente ridotto e anche questo ha contribuito a 
una presenza più ampia delle donne nel mondo del lavoro, ma anche della cultura, dell'arte e, in 
maniera forse un po' più limitata, della politica. 
A fronte di questa evoluzione persiste ancora un quadro giuridico restrittivo e una pratica 
sociale di natura patriarcale che, entrambi, sono ormai in aperto contrasto con il mondo 
femminile. I dati li conoscete, sono noti: una donna non può chiedere il divorzio, né ottenere 
l'affidamento dei figli e così via. 
Contro questo quadro legale che, [...] si è costituito un movimento femminile che è molto attivo 
e che comprende donne di tutte le appartenenze. Donne che provengono dall'interno del mondo 
islamico e donne che sono in qualche modo un po' più ai margini di questa realtà. E non è un 
movimento completamente isolato sul piano politico. In generale si può dire che, malgrado le 
apparenze, il Paese presenta tutte le condizioni per una rivoluzione nella condizione delle donne. 
Abbiamo, poi, un importante fattore che è quello della urbanizzazione che si era avviata già nel 
periodo precedente la rivoluzione, anzi ne è stata in parte una delle cause, e ha contribuito a creare 
una nuova identità che è quella del cittadino. Molti dei quali ricorderanno Sha'vand ***  è il titolo 
anche di un famoso quotidiano del municipio di Tehran che sottolineava questa nuova categoria. Un 
cittadino che si libera progressivamente dei comportamenti sociali collettivi associati, quindi, 
all'appartenenza a un gruppo etnico, tribale, religioso o professionale. 
Non è più possibile, o almeno lo è sempre di meno, analizzare la società iraniana in termini di 
sistemi tradizionali o sociologicamente coerenti: i cittadini, gli abitanti rurali, i nomadi, i sunniti e 
così via. Il mescolamento di tali categorie all'interno di realtà vaste, si pensi per esempio alla città 
di Tehran, e la presenza di strategie individuali di comportamento [sono] sempre più evident[i] e 
costituisc[ono] in sé un fattore di cambiamento importante nei rapporti all'interno della struttura 
sociale. 
La crescita della componente urbanizzata non ha significato, però, o almeno non ancora, la 
perdita di importanza delle aree rurali che sono state oggetto di un'integrazione realizzata, senza 
grandi traumi questa volta, grazie alla rete di legami che le nuove élite intrattengono con queste 
realtà dalle quali spesso provengono e con le quali parlano un linguaggio comune. 
Un fattore che è rivoluzionario nel vero senso della parola, nel contesto dei rapporti tra Stato e 
cittadini in Iran, è costituito poi dalla partecipazione alla vita politica, dalla politicizzazione dei 
singoli. L'Iran ha conosciuto dei momenti di azione politica collettiva – ricordiamo tutti la 
rivoluzione costituzionale – ma sono stati comunque dei movimenti limitati ad alcune fasce della 
popolazione, la più istruita e occidentalizzata, ed eventualmente una parte illuminata del clero. 
La mobilitazione generale intorno agli eventi rivoluzionari e anche nelle successive lotte tra i 
gruppi,  che avevano preso parte, ha aperto, invece, la strada a forme di partecipazione nuove che 
hanno coinvolto per la prima volta non solo gli intellettuali e una ristrettissima classe dirigente, ma 
tutta la popolazione compresi i gruppi rimasti storicamente ai margini. 
L'organizzazione dello Stato in forma repubblicana che, benché islamica, prevede regolari 
consultazioni elettorali ha consolidato l'attitudine alla partecipazione. Gli iraniani sanno che votare 
può cambiare il loro destino, se lo fanno o non lo fanno, ma sanno che può cambiare il loro destino. 
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Le elezioni sono condizionate da un controllo preventivo dei candidati e non sono immuni dalla 
manipolazione (anche se non in misura maggiore di tanti altri paesi) ma esistono, sono regolari e 
determinano una vita politica movimentata con raggruppamenti politici contrapposti, scontri, 
vittorie, perdite, momenti di consenso e momenti di astensione da parte dell'elettorato. Le prossime 
presidenziali saranno in queste *** un banco di prova consdierati anche *** i nomi dei candidati . 
Infine, altra trasformazione decisiva, ultima in questa lista ma sicuramente importante: 
l'assunzione diretta del potere da parte del clero ha avuto come conseguenza la cooptazione nel 
processo di evoluzione della società di una componente la cui opposizione aveva fatto fallire i 
precedenti tentativi di modernizzazione. Posti di fronte alla necessità di governare, i religiosi, anche 
quelli più tradizionalisti, si sono confrontati con la realtà viva del Paese e hanno sviluppato al loro 
interno una dialettica che sta determinando importanti evoluzioni. Si pensi, per fare un solo esempio, 
alla critica del modello dello Stato che proviene dal clero riformista o dai cosiddetti intellettuali 
religiosi e all'influenza che essa ha avuto attraverso l'esperienza del precedente governo. 
L'Islam iraniano, questa è una delle tesi che fa da cavallo di battaglia di un libro di Bernard 
Hourcade, “Iran : Nouvelles identités d'une république” – che vi consiglio veramente di leggere –, 
ha vissuto dopo la rivoluzione un cambiamento profondo modernizzandosi e consolidandosi e le 
conseguenze di questo processo appaiono durature, perché contemporaneamente si sono 
modernizzati i gruppi sociali ad esso tradizionalmente associati. 
Nuovi soggetti hanno preso nelle mani la gestione complessiva del Paese. Provengono dalle file 
della rivoluzione, sono stati militanti, hanno fatto la guerra e poi, con il ritorno alla normalità, hanno 
studiato nelle università iraniane e all'estero, sono politicamente più spesso conservatori che non 
progressisti, ma sono modernisti negli affari e liberali in materia dei rapporti internazionali. E 
soprattutto hanno un'identità precisa: sono islamici, sono repubblicani e, come dimostra la 
questione nucleare, sono nazionalisti. 
Concludendo, se si osserva l'Iran di oggi, avendo di fronte l'aspetto complessivo della sua realtà, 
è evidente che l'utilizzo del paradigma tradizione-modernità con l'Islam associato esclusivamente a 
tradizione non è più possibile, perché le dinamiche della società iraniana comprendono l'Islam 
come fattore di cambiamento duraturo; che al momento il cambiamento è più sociale che politico 
ma che- proprio perché la società iraniana è oggi giovane, educata e in maggioranza urbana, non 
ostile alla cultura internazionale, alla scienza, alla tecnologia, con in mano strumenti di 
partecipazione alla vita politica che può attivare - il cambiamento, che grazie alle nuove generazioni 
appare inevitabile, avrà carattere duraturo.” 
Fonte:  http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/272562/iran-1979-la-rivoluzione-islamica-
trentanni-dopo 
Trascrizione: David Eickhoff, October 17, 2011  
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APPENDIX B 
Region / income level Male gross secondary school 
enrolment (2009) 
Iran compared with 
region/income level 
  percentage 
points 
percentage 
Iran 85,26% - - 
    
World 69,17% +16.09 +23.27% 
    
High income: OECD 100,89% -15.63 -15.49% 
Upper middle income 81,27% +4.00 +4.92% 
Middle income 69,60% +15.66 +22.50% 
Lower middle income 60,84% +24.42 +40.14% 
Low income 41,91% +43.36 +103.45% 
    
Arab World 74,70% +10.56 +14.14% 
Europe & Central Asia 
(developing only) 
90,75% -5.48 -6.04% 
Latin America & Caribbean (all 
income levels) 
85,63% -0.37 -0.43% 
Middle East & North Africa (all 
income levels) 
77,25% +8.02 +10.38% 
Sub-Saharan Africa (all income 
levels) 
40,14% +45.13 +112.43% 
Table 11: Iran's performance in male gross secondary school enrolment – Source: World Bank  
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APPENDIX C 
 Data source Reference year 
(last available) 
GDP measures World Bank Development Indicators 2001-2009 
Years of Peace Gleditsch (2004) 2011 
Population 
& education 
UN (2008 census) 
and World Bank Development Indicators 
2008 
2009 
Juvenile unemployment World Bank Development Indicators 2008 
Oil rents 
& OPEC basket price 
World Bank Development Indicators 
and OPEC 
2000-2009 
2000-2011 
Ethnic composition & religion CIA World Factbook 
and Ellingsen (2004) 
2008 
1995/2001 
Table 12: Data sources 
APPENDIX D 
Region / income level 
Male juvenile unemployment 
rate (2008) 
Iran compared with 
region/income level 
  percentage 
points 
percentage 
Iran 20.21% - - 
    
High income: OECD 13.84% +6.37 +46.00% 
    
Euro area 15.80% +4.41 +27.94% 
Europe & Central Asia (developing 
only) 
16.49% +3.73 +22.60% 
Latin America & Caribbean (all 
income levels) 
11.74% +8.47 +72.14% 
Italy 23.25% -3.04 -13.06% 
Spain 39.08% -18.87 -48.28% 
Table 13: Iran's performance in male juvenile unemployment (15-24 years) – Source: World bank 
APPENDIX E 
 Iran Sample 
mean 
Peace 
mean 
War start 
mean 
Correlation 
coefficient 
Level of 
significance 
ln(GDP per capita) 7.608 8.604 8.659 7.003 -0.203 * 
GDP per capita growth (t-1) 0.62% 1.84% 2.01% -0.49% -0.145 *** 
Years of Peace 29 32 33 16 -0.057 *** 
Proportion of young men of 
age 15-29 in total population 
17.89% 12.90% 12.90% 13.10% 17.423 * 
Population 73.97 30.20 28.30 56.50 0.284 *** 
Table 14: Iran data and Collier et al. (2006) sample means 
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APPENDIX F 
US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, interviewed by BBC Persian and Voice of America: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ED0iU-sMaGA) 
http://www.rferl.org/video/27081.html 
APPENDIX G 
Newsroom Header Link 
 June 20, 2009 
Aljazeera 
English 
Iran police “use gas” on protesters http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2
009/06/2009620132648106415.html 
BBC Iran police clash with protesters http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8110
582.stm 
July 30, 2009 (end of forty-days mourning period for June victims) 
BBC Iran Police clash with mourners http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8175
764.stm 
 December 20-21, 2009 (mourning over Grand Ayatollah Montazeri) 
Spiegel 
Online 
Thousands of regime opponents 
heading for Grand Ayatollah's funeral 
service 
(Tausende Regimegegner strömen zur 
Trauerfeier für Großajatollah) 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518
,druck-668183,00.html 
 December 28, 2009 (Ashura mourning) 
Spiegel 
Online 
Tehran confirms death of eight people 
(Teheran bestätigt Tod von acht 
Menschen) 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518
,druck-669178,00.html 
 December 31, 2009 
Spiegel 
Online 
Tear gas against demonstrators in 
Tehran 
(Tränengas gegen Demonstranten in 
Teheran) 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518
,druck-669700,00.html 
Table 15: Press review Iran, June - December 2009 
